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Personal computing users are vulnerable to information security threats, as they must 
independently make decisions about how to protect themselves, often with little understanding of 
technology or its implications. However, personal computing users are under-represented in security 
research studies, especially for mobile device use. The study described in this paper addresses this 
research gap by evaluating data from 629 home computer and mobile device users to improve 
understanding of security behavior in both contexts. The research model extends protection 
motivation theory by including the roles of social influences and psychological ownership, and by 
including actual behavior. The model was separately tested with home computer users and mobile 
device users and data reveals that some of the determinants of security behavior differ between 
home computer and mobile device use. The results show that perceived vulnerability, self-efficacy, 
response cost, descriptive norm and psychological ownership all influenced personal computing 
security intentions and behavior for both home computer users and mobile device users. However, 
perceived severity was only found to play a role in mobile device security behavior and neither 
response efficacy nor subjective norm influenced security intentions for either type of user. These 
findings are discussed in terms of their practical and research implications as well as generating new 
research opportunities into personal computing security.   
Keywords 
Behavioral IS security, information security, mobile device security, home computer security, 
protection motivation theory 
 
1 Introduction 
The pervasiveness and accessibility of the Internet have provided immense social benefit by linking 
communities and dissolving geographic boundaries. However, while communities have been brought 
together by developments in technology, this free, borderless communication has opened up new 
avenues for crime and fraud, exposing millions of home computer users to cyber criminals across the 
globe.  To compound this issue further, attackers increasingly pick the soft targets in order to 
minimize their effort. Attacks such as the record 1.2 Tbps Denial of Service attacks reported in late 
2016 (Symantec Security Response, 2016) demonstrate that malicious actors have their sights set on 
the home computer sector, not just as the eventual targets, but even as instruments in larger 
attacks.  
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Kaspersky’s Threat Evolution report provides some insights into the extent of the issues faced in the 
mobile arena. In Q1 2016 over 2 million malicious installation packages were detected by their 
mobile telemetry. This was an increase of 11 percent over the previous quarter, and 23 percent over 
Q3 2015 (Kaspersky Labs, 2016). The trend is continuing, with no signs of slowing. The same report 
highlights the growth in attacks on mobile banking apps. For example, a single strain of the Marcher 
Trojan was attacking nearly 40 mobile banking apps in Europe. This suggests that home users are 
increasingly at risk when they transact on the Internet.  
Studies of user security behavior with an organizational focus have been more prevalent than those 
relating to home user behavior, often aiming to reveal the factors that may influence an employee’s 
intention to comply with information security policies (e.g. Ifinedo, 2012; Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila, 2014). However, this over-representation of organization-focused research is giving way to 
more recent studies of home computer users (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010; 
Mwagwabi, McGill, & Dixon, 2014; Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009) in 
recognition of the vulnerability of home users and the potential flow on effects from home user 
breaches to organizational breaches (Jenkins, Grimes, Proudfoot, & Lowry, 2014; Winkler, 2009). 
While there may be similarities in “security behavior” that span both the organizational and home 
environments, Li and Siponen (2011) identified nine contextual factors that differentiate the home 
setting from organizational use, including the role of technical support, training, sanctions and 
organizational policies among others, calling for focused research with home users. It is, therefore, 
necessary to directly study the home user environment to better understand and ultimately 
safeguard this large segment. 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975, 1983) has been widely used to try to explain user 
security behavior with some success (e.g., Crossler, Long, Loraas, & Trinkle, 2014; Herath & Rao, 
2009; Ifinedo, 2012; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012); however, the majority of this research has 
taken place in an organizational context and research using it to understand personal computing 
security behavior has shown more mixed results, particularly with respect to the role of perceived 
vulnerability to threats (Liang and Xue 2010; Mwagwabi, McGill, and Dixon 2014; Zhang and 
McDowell 2009).  The study described in this paper addresses the need to improve understanding of 
home computer and mobile device computing security behavior by testing a model of personal 
computing security behavior that is based on PMT, but is extended to incorporate findings from the 
personal computing domain on the roles of psychological ownership and social influence (Anderson 
& Agarwal, 2010; Tu, Turel, Yuan, & Archer, 2015).  
Johnston, Warkentin, and Siponen (2015) argue that future studies should investigate the 
applicability of PMT in different security domains. There has been a rapid expansion of personal 
computing from being primarily computer based to encompassing a variety of mobile devices, and 
this has implications not only for the individuals affected but for organizations that allow employees 
to access personal online accounts from organizational computers or support Bring Your Own Device 
(BYOD). In this paper, the proposed model is tested for both home computer use, and for mobile 
device use, in order to better understand the factors that are most likely to influence user behavior 
on a given platform. To the best of our knowledge, this this is the first study to do this, and the 
results show that there are differences in the determinants of security behavior between device 
types.   
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The study also looks beyond security intentions to actual security behavior. Much of the previous 
behavioral information security research employs intention based models that use behavioral 
intention as a surrogate for actual behavior, yet individuals do not always act in accordance with 
their behavioral intention (Ajzen, Brown, & Carvajal, 2004).  Thus further understanding of the 
relationship between intentions and actual behavior in the personal computing security domain is 
required. The proposed model provides a framework to do so, and this study examines the 
relationship between security intentions and actual security behavior for both home computer use 
and mobile device use, and possible reasons for the difference that is found are explored.  
 
2 Related Work 
2.1 PMT as a framework to study home computer security 
PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983) was developed to explain how to influence risky behavior and to 
understand how the components of a persuasive message are critical. Grounded in the theory of 
fear appeals, it suggests that the behavior of individuals when faced by a risk is dictated by their 
threat appraisal (how severe they perceive the impact of this threat to be and how likely they 
believe it is to occur) and their coping appraisal (how effective and costly they perceive threat 
avoidance behavior to be and their appraisal of their ability to perform the protective behavior). 
Although originally developed in the health domain to consider risks of smoking or transmittable 
diseases, PMT has been found useful in research of other kinds of risks, notably those in the 
computer security arena. 
Rogers’ original PMT (Rogers, 1975) considers the components of fear appeals and how these 
components influence the process of coping or taking a protective behavioral response. PMT was 
later revised to pay greater attention to the sources of information contributing to the process and 
to cognitive mediating processes (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1983). The addition of self-
efficacy, costs associated with protective behavior and perceived rewards for not performing 
behavior provided a more comprehensive model. 
Threat appraisal includes perceived vulnerability and perceived severity of risks, as well as any 
perceived rewards associated with the risky behavior. Elements of high vulnerability, high severity 
and low reward would predispose individuals to a higher protection motivation and thus behavior. 
Coping appraisal is made up of the perceptions of response efficacy and self-efficacy as well as any 
perceptions of costs associated with the protective response behavior. Self-efficacy is the belief that 
individuals hold about their own abilities to perform a protective behavior. Response efficacy is the 
belief regarding the effectiveness of the protective behavior, if taken. Response cost relates to any 
costs associated with taking the protective behavior. In a computer security context, this cost is not 
always reflected in monetary terms. It may be also perceived in terms of convenience or time taken 
to perform a task. If an individual believes that the recommended protective behavior is effective, 
that the response cost is acceptable, and that they have the ability to take the necessary action, then 
they are more likely to undertake the protective behavior.  
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2.2 Extending the PMT for the personal computing security arena 
Many information security research models are directly derived from PMT, whereas others (e.g., 
Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010) draw from the more general Theory of Planned Behavior 
(TPB) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) that offers a view of how behavioral and control beliefs direct the 
intentions of the individual. Security studies that include a comprehensive set of the original PMT 
constructs are generally able to explain 0.34-0.50 of the variance in a studied population. While this 
is greater than studies using TPB have been able to achieve (Sommestad & Hallberg, 2013), there is 
still scope to extend PMT to increase its explanatory capability in the home computer security 
domain.  
Previous research that has adapted and extended PMT to reflect the personal computing security 
domain includes studies by Johnston and Warkentin (2010) and Anderson and Agarwal (2010).  
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) explored the role of social influence and found that it had a stronger 
relationship with intentions to perform security behaviors than either response efficacy or self-
efficacy. Anderson and Agarwal (2010) explored the roles of both social influences and the role of 
psychological ownership and found that broadening the consideration of influences on security 
intentions beyond the PMT constructs was of value in helping to improve personal computing 
security behavior.  
3 Model and Hypotheses 
This research aims to improve understanding of personal computing security behavior by proposing 
and testing a research model, illustrated in Figure 1, which is applicable to both home computer user 
and mobile device user behavior.  In the proposed model, we extend the core PMT model in a 
several ways. Firstly, people’s opinions and behavior are likely to be influenced by others. Social and 
peer influences were included in the TPB as subjective norm (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The TPB was 
later extended by Sheeran and Orbell (1999) to include descriptive norm. Our model incorporates 
both subjective and descriptive norm: where subjective norm is defined as to a user’s beliefs as to 
whether others want them to perform security behaviors and descriptive norm refers to what a user 
believes most other people do in terms of protecting their devices.  These external influences have 




Psychological ownership refers to the relationship between a person and an object, in which the 
person perceives a connection with the object (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003). Psychological 
ownership was included as an additional determinant of security related intentions to account for 
feelings of psychological ownership potentially being associated with sense of responsibility 
(Beaglehole, 1932), in this case for the device and the software and information it contains, and thus 
associated with differing levels of security related behaviors (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Van Dyne & 
Pierce, 2004). 
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The potential role of prior experience with information security breaches is also included as it may 
influence future threat appraisal (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Finally our research model includes 
security behavior, which is a valuable addition as it addresses the call for more use of measures of 
actual behavior (Crossler et al., 2013).  
The model has been designed to provide a more complete understanding of user security behavior 
in the personal computing domain than the models used in previous studies such those of Anderson 
and Agarwal (2010) and Tu et al. (2015). While recognizing the potential value of also considering 
social norms and psychological ownership, it includes a more extensive set of the PMT (Rogers, 
1975, 1983) constructs and extends beyond security intentions to model actual behavior. 
3.1 PMT-related hypotheses 
Although Rogers (1983) added perceived rewards associated with not performing the recommended 
behavior, relatively few studies have explored its role in determining protection motivation.  
Abraham, Sheeran, Abrams, and Spears (1994) have suggested that rewards and response cost can 
be operationalized as a single construct by rewording. Based on this we did not consider the role of 
rewards in this study. 
Threat appraisals have been found to predict security intentions in some studies, although there 
have been mixed findings. Perceived vulnerability to threat refers to users’ subjectively estimated 
probability that a security threat will occur and in this study perceived vulnerability is defined as the 
extent to which a user believes they are likely to experience security threats to their personal 
computing device. Perceived vulnerability to threats has generally been found to influence security 
behavior in the organizational domain (Ifinedo, 2012; Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009; Siponen et al., 
2014; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008), but there have been less consistent findings about its 
impact on personal information security behavior. For example, although Liang and Xue (2010), 
Chenoweth, Minch, and Gattiker (2009) and Claar and Johnson (2012) found the anticipated positive 
influence, Crosser’s (2010) study found that perceived vulnerability unexpectedly had a negative 
influence on security behavior.  Also, neither Woon et al. (2005), Zhang and McDowell (2009) nor 
Tsai et al. (2016) observed any effect. Despite the mixed previous findings in the personal computing 
domain, consistent with the relationship proposed by PMT (Rogers, 1983), we hypothesize that: 
H1: Perceived vulnerability will positively influence personal computing security intentions 
 
In this study, we define perceived severity as the extent to which users believe that the 
consequences of threats to their personal computing device would be detrimental. In the 
organizational domain perceived severity has generally been found to influence security intentions 
(e.g., Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2015; Siponen et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2012). However, some 
authors believe that there are differences in threat appraisal influences in the personal computing 
domain and that they are associated with more emotional responses to threats (Liang and Xue 2010; 
Mwagwabi, McGill, and Dixon 2014; Zhang and McDowell 2009). Consistent with this, findings on the 
role of perceived severity have been somewhat mixed in the personal computing domain. Woon et 
al. (2005) found that personal computing users are more likely to enable wireless security measures 
if they believe a breach on their home wireless network would be detrimental. In a study of BYOD 
policy compliance, Crossler and Belanger (2014) found that perceived severity was positively related 
to security behaviors. However, Zhang and McDowell (2009) found that it did not significantly 
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predict password security behavior and Tsai et al. (2016) unexpectedly found that perceived severity 
had a negative influence on the security intentions of personal computing users.   
Despite the lack of clarity around this relationship, we propose that consistent with PMT (Rogers, 
1983), users will be more likely to intend to take protective measures with their personal computing 
device if they believe that the consequences of threats would be severe, and hypothesize that: 
H2: Perceived severity will positively influence personal computing security intentions 
 
Coping appraisal generally plays a much clearer role in positively influencing security intentions. In 
an organizational context, intention to comply with policies has been shown to be influenced by self-
efficacy as well as response efficacy (e.g. Herath & Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012). Studies of employees’ 
security behavior when dealing with email messages or attachments have shown the importance of 
both self-efficacy (Ng et al., 2009) and response efficacy (Herath et al., 2014).  
In the non-work context, LaRose, Rifon, and Enbody (2008) found that of the factors they studied, 
self-efficacy and response efficacy were the most important to promoting secure behavior online. Tu 
et al. (2015) found that both self-efficacy and response efficacy positively influenced intention to 
protect mobile devices.  Both self-efficacy and response efficacy have also been shown to influence 
intention to use anti-spyware software (Liang and Xue 2010), intention to comply with password 
guidelines (Mwagwabi, McGill, and Dixon 2014), enabling of firewalls (Woon, Tan, and Low 2005) 
and frequent backing up (Crossler 2010). One of the few exceptions to this pattern is Tsai et al. 
(2016). They found that while response efficacy was the second strongest predictor of security 
intentions in their model, the relationship between self-efficacy and general security intentions was 
not significant, suggesting that there is a still a need for further study to fully understand this 
relationship.  Consistent with the majority of previous research we hypothesize that both self-
efficacy and response efficacy will have positive influences on the security intentions of personal 
computing users: 
H3: Self-efficacy will positively influence personal computing security intentions 
H4: Response efficacy will positively influence personal computing security intentions 
 
Response cost refers to not only financial cost, but also to any time, effort or inconvenience that the 
user may associate with the protective behavior. These costs often reduce behavioral motivation as 
the individual may perform some kind of cost-benefit analysis before proceeding with an action. 
Response cost has been shown to play an important role in the personal computing domain, such 
that increases in perceived response cost negatively influence intentions to perform security 
behaviors (Liang and Xue 2010; Woon, Tan, and Low 2005; Mwagwabi, McGill, and Dixon 2014). 
Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H5: Response cost will negatively influence personal computing security intentions 
 
3.2 Prior experience with a security incident 
Prior security threat experience is often left out of PMT based security research in spite of the fact 
that this factor was presented as a relevant source of information shaping threat appraisal in the 
revised PMT model (Rogers, 1983).  
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Personal experience with exposure to threats is considered to be another form of acquired 
knowledge that could affect perceived vulnerability (Weinstein, Lyon, Rothman, & Cuite, 2000) and 
through it, behavior.  Consistent with this, in the organizational information security domain, Boss 
(2007) found that both personal experience and knowledge about others’ exposure to information 
security threats influenced perceived vulnerability. The role of previous experience with security 
threats may be all the more crucial in a home user environment, as personal computing users may 
have had little or no security awareness training (Furnell, Bryant, & Phippen, 2007), and hence may 
depend more on personal experience when shaping their own behaviors and responses.  
Some prior research has explored the role of previous security threat experience in the context of 
personal computing. Tsai et al. (2016) found that prior experience directly predicted general 
behavioral security intentions. Lee, Larose, and Rifon (2008) found that prior experience influenced 
intention to adopt virus protection. In the context of password security, Mwagwabi et al. (2014) 
found that prior exposure to hacking influenced perceived vulnerability to password related threats. 
We define prior experience as prior exposure to an information security breach, experienced by a 
user, and propose that if a user has experienced a breach such as having an online account hacked 
the experience should elevate their perceived vulnerability. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:  
H6: Prior experience of a security breach will positively influence perceived vulnerability  
 
3.3 Social and peer influences 
Subjective norm refers to an individual’s perceptions as to whether significant others/peers desire 
them to perform a behavior. It has been found to be a significant determinant of behavioral 
intention (Ajzen, 1991; Taylor & Todd, 1995). Descriptive norm refers to perceptions regarding what 
an individual believes most other people do. It has been found to be an additional determinant of 
behavioral intention beyond the TPB constructs (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003).  
There has been little research on the role of subjective norm or descriptive norm in personal 
information security behavior but it is likely that they are pertinent, because the formal approaches 
to improving security behavior that organizational users are exposed to are not found in the 
personal use sphere (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Tu et al. 2015). Devices and software are supplied 
with little or no documentation, and users are expected to independently seek any further 
information from online resources. Usability developers strive for products that a new user is able to 
simply pick up and immediately start operating. This initial ease of use, however, comes at a cost as 
the users may have gaps in their security knowledge. These gaps can then be filled by discussing 
products with friends and relatives, thus heightening the potential role of subjective norm and 
descriptive norm. 
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) considered both and found that subjective norm influenced intention 
to perform security related behaviors on home computers, but not those associated with protecting 
the Internet. Conversely, descriptive norm was a significant determinant of intention to perform 
security behaviors to protect the Internet, but not to protect one’s own home computer.  More 
recently, Tu et al. (2015) also explored the role of social influences on protection against personal 
device theft and found that they played an important role in determining users’ knowledge of 
responses to threat, perceptions of the degree of threat and intentions to take protective action. 
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Similarly, Tsai et al. (2016) showed that subjective norm had a strong effect on security intentions, 
and called for future work to explore the role of descriptive norm.  From this we hypothesize that: 
H7: Subjective norm will positively influence personal computing security intentions 
H8: Descriptive norm will positively influence personal computing security intentions  
 
3.4 Psychological ownership 
Prior research has considered the role of feelings of psychological ownership in shaping an 
individual’s behaviors and attitudes. This for instance has been studied in the context of employee’s 
behaviors in a work role (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Psychological ownership is the phenomenon 
experienced when an individual develops possessive feelings toward a particular target, whether 
that be a tangible or an intangible object (Beaglehole, 1932). In this study, psychological ownership 
refers to the extent to which a user feels ownership of a computing device and the software and 
information it contains, such that it becomes an “extension of the self” (McCracken, 1986). 
Beaglehole (1932) also suggests that these feelings of ownership trigger a sense of responsibility for 
the target. This sense of responsibility may be manifested in differing levels of security related 
behaviors. 
In an organizational context, Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) proposed that psychological ownership 
would be related to extra, volitional behaviors. These discretionary actions such as volunteering to 
help others are intended to benefit the organization: the target of the feelings of ownership. At 
home, security behaviors are neither mandated nor checked, and may be analogous to this situation 
as discretionary activities intended to preserve the security of the device and information. 
Consistent with this, Anderson and Agarwal (2010) proposed that psychological ownership of both 
one’s own computer and the Internet are positively associated with behavioral intentions to protect 
them. They found that home users had high levels of psychological ownership for their computers 
and that this weakly influenced their intentions to protect their computer. Their participants had 
lower levels of psychological ownership of the Internet, but a relationship was also found with 
intentions to protect the Internet. Thus we hypothesize that: 
H9: Psychological ownership will positively influence personal computing security intentions 
3.5 Measures of actual behavior 
Problems with the security behavior of home computer users have been reported widely (Howe, 
Ray, Roberts, Urbanska, & Byrne, 2012). Although less is known about the security behavior of 
mobile users (Mylonas, Kastania, and Gritzalis 2013), it is an emerging issue (Androulidakis, 2016). 
Much of the prior work on behavioral information security employs intention based models that use 
behavioral intention as a surrogate for actual behavior; these are largely based on models such as 
TPB (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and PMT (Rogers, 1983), which assume that behavior is predicted by 
behavioral intentions. This assumption continues to inform model development in information 
security, in spite of reports that it is not uncommon to observe that individuals often fail to act in 
accordance with their behavioral intention (Ajzen et al., 2004).  Thus further understanding of the 
relationship between intentions and actual behavior in the home computer security domain is 
required. 
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Our proposed research model includes a relationship between security intentions and actual security 
behavior to reflect the extent to which intentions translate into actual behavior. Several previous 
information security studies provide evidence to support this extension of the model.  In the 
organizational security domain, Siponen et al. (2014) found that intention to comply with security 
policies had a strong influence on actual compliance. In the personal computing domain studies by 
Liang and Xue (2010) and Shropshire, Warkentin, and Sharma (2015) have confirmed the 
relationship, therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H10: Security intentions will positively influence information security behavior 
 
3.6 Different personal computing environments: home computer versus mobile 
device 
Personal computing was previously largely restricted to desktop and laptop computers. However, 
the use of smartphones and tablets to access and store personal data, and for tasks such as shopping 
and banking is growing rapidly (Dulaney et al., 2014). Although in the past users have been reluctant 
to undertake financial transactions on their smartphones (Chin, Felt, Sekar, & Wagner, 2012), banks 
and businesses are investing significantly in the creation of user friendly applications to encourage 
customers to access their services using smartphones and tablets. Gartner Inc. predict that “by 2018, 
more than 50% of users will go to a tablet or smartphone first for all online activities” (Dulaney et al., 
2014, p. 2).  
In a mobile device environment, many functions are operationalized differently. This is due to a 
combination of the different operating environment (i.e. on the move), different constraints (e.g. 
battery life, network speed) and different interfaces (e.g. touch screen instead of keys). The 
predominantly touchscreen interface may also have implications for individual security behavior. 
Limited screen-space and on screen keyboard render it difficult to utilize special characters or even 
capital letters and thus make complying with recommendations for password strength more 
difficult. Users on smartphone platforms are taught that there are different rules for smartphones, 
for example, by companies who forgo the password complexity rules when logging in from a mobile 
device (Facebook, 2016). At the operating system level, mobile platforms contain very advanced and 
highly granular access control models (e.g. Google Inc, 2016). This results in a large number of 
prompts which may not be intuitive to the user, potentially habituating them to simply click through 
(Anderson, Vance, Jenkins, Kirwan, & Bjornn, 2017). 
With the shift to increased use of mobile devices for personal computing comes the need for more 
understanding of how the information security behavior for different device types is influenced. This 
is particularly important as there have been many reports that users display less safe behavior with 
mobile devices than with their home computers (Kelley, Camp, Lien, & Stebila, 2012; Mylonas, 
Kastania, & Gritzalis, 2013; Wood, Nahorney, Chandrasekar, Wallace, & Haley, 2015). For example, 
Mylonas et al. (2013) reported that the security awareness of mobile device users is limited and 
Kelley et al. (2012) found that they ignore security messages. A Symantec report (Wood et al., 2015) 
noted that many users only consider security threats with respect to their home computers.  
In order to better understand the potential role of device type in personal computing security 
behavior, the research model was evaluated in the context of both home computer use and mobile 
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device use, to investigate whether the context or environment may influence the perceptions and 
ultimately security behaviors of users. Thus, we propose the following research question: 
RQ1: Do the determinants of personal computing security behavior differ between home 
computer and mobile device use? 
4 Method 
In this study, home computers are considered to include both desktop and laptop machines. Whilst 
laptops provide greater flexibility in terms of the locations they can be used, they offer essentially 
the same functionality and operating environments as desktops, therefore the desired security 
behavior is largely the same. Smartphones and tablets differ from home computers in that they 
utilize apps from an app-store rather than regular ”boxed” software and provide a touchscreen 
interface; in this study these are categorized as mobile devices.  Although there are also devices that 
overlap these two categories (e.g. Microsoft Surface Pro), these are not included in the study.  
The target population for the study was personal computing users, and data to test the proposed 
research model was collected from two groups of users: home computer (desktop/laptop) users and 
mobile device (smartphone/tablet) users via an anonymous online questionnaire. 
4.1 Sample and data collection procedure 
A third party recruiting company was used to recruit participants from a wide spectrum of 
backgrounds including age, gender, level of education, computer skills and computer security 
knowledge. The recruiting company used census balanced random sampling to identify potential 
participants from their panel members, and they were then were contacted via email and invited to 
complete the questionnaire, which was hosted on SurveyMonkey. All participants were located in 
the United States, aged 18 or over and had both a home computer and a mobile device. 
Respondents first answered several background questions about themselves and provided basic 
usage information for both types of devices. They were then randomly allocated to one of two 
groups to answer more detailed security perceptions and usage questions relating to either 
smartphone/tablet, or home computer/laptop security.   
4.2 Measures  
The constructs measured were: prior experience, perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, self-
efficacy, response efficacy, response cost, subjective norm, descriptive norm, psychological 
ownership, security intentions and security behavior. To ensure validity and reliability of the items 
used to measure the model constructs, we selected items that had been validated in relevant 
behavioral security research studies wherever possible. These items were slightly reworded for the 
personal computing domain as necessary. Appendix A provides a list of all of the items and their 
sources, and as can be seen only the items used to measure psychological ownership had to be 
newly created.  The two sets of items (for home computers / and mobile devices) were kept 
consistent and varied only in the device that was referred to: either “smartphone / tablet” or “home 
computer / laptop”. Given the broad range of threats to which personal computing users may be 
subject, the introductory material and the questionnaire items referred to security breaches in 
general, but gave examples of possible threats and their impacts. 
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The items to measure each of the constructs of interest, apart from prior experience and security 
behavior, were measured on 7 point Likert scales from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree”. 
The item used to measure prior experience was measured on a scale of 0 if the participant answered 
“No” to having experienced a security breach or 1 (low impact) to 5 (high impact) depending on the 
extent of the impact of the breach. Security behavior was measured using five items each of which 
asked whether the participant about whether or not they performed a specific common security 
behavior. These items were chosen as representative of recommended personal computing security 
behaviors and each was answered as 1 for “Yes” or 0 for “No” or “Unsure”. A composite variable was 
calculated as the sum of the responses to the five items.  
The initial items were pilot tested with several members of the target population and in response to 
their feedback minor changes were made to the wording of several items and to the survey interface 
to improve understandability. 
4.3 Data screening 
Data screening was undertaken to identify participants who had not fully engaged with the 
questionnaire and thus impacted data quality. This screening involved removal of responses with 
zero variance, and responses where questionnaire completion took either below half of the 
minimum estimated completion time or twice the maximum estimated completion time (Huang, 
Curran, Keeney, Poposki, & DeShon, 2012). 
5 Results 
A total of 629 valid responses (62.5% female and 37.5% male) were used in the analysis: 322 from 
home computer respondents and 307 from mobile device respondents. Table 1 provides background 
information about them. The age distribution of the participants differed from that of the US 
population at the time the data was collected in that there was a greater representation of users in 
the 55-64 age group, and a lower representation of those under 34 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014). 
There were no significant differences between the home computer respondents and mobile device 
respondents in terms of gender (χ2 (1, N=624) = 1.643; p = 0.200) or age (χ2 (6, N=623) = 2.011; 
p=0.919.  
 
The majority of participants rated their skill with computers as good or excellent (64.7%), however, 
only 18.9% had previously received any information security training. There were no significant 
differences between home computer respondents and mobile device respondents in either self-
rated skill with computers (χ2 (4, N=629) = 1.417; p = 0.841) or whether they had received 
information security training (χ2 (1, N=629) = 0.691; p = 0.406). 
The model was tested using Partial Least Squares (PLS), a structural equation modelling method for 
complex predictive models and theory building (Barclay, Higgins, & Thompson, 1995; Chin, 1998). 
SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005) was used to estimate the model and the bootstrap re-
sampling method (using 1,000 samples) was used to determine the significance of the paths in the 
structural model. PLS was the preferred analytical technique of this study as Shapiro-Wilk tests were 
significant, showing that the measurements were not normally distributed. According to Hair, Hult, 
Ringle, and Sarstedt (2014), PLS is more appropriate with non-normally distributed data.  
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Before evaluating the models, we conducted two common method variance (CMV) tests to examine 
whether common method bias was a concern (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). First, 
an explanatory factor analysis of all items extracted nine factors explaining 77.61% of the variance, 
with no single factor accounting for significant loading (at the p < 0.05 level) for all items. Further, an 
unmeasured latent method factor was added and all items were loaded on both their theoretical 
constructs and the method factor (Bagozzi, 2011). This model fit well: χ2 [951] = 2855.81, p <.00, 
RMSEA = .056, SRMR = .033, and CFI = .99. All item loadings on the common method factor were 
much lower than the loadings on their respective constructs, and most loadings on the common 
method factor were not significant. Therefore, CMV is probably not a concern in this data set.  
First construct validity of the proposed measurement model were determined, and once a 
satisfactory measurement model was obtained, the structural model was estimated for both home 
computers and mobile device use. The measures of reflective constructs from the home computer 
dataset demonstrate good psychometric properties. Convergent validity was confirmed by meeting 
the following criteria (Gefen & Straub, 2005; Hulland, 1999): the loadings of each item were all 
significant and above the cut-off value of 0.60 (see Appendix B Table B.1); the composite reliabilities 
(CR) and Cronbach’s Alphas (CA) of all constructs were above 0.70 (Table 2); the average variance 
extracted (AVE) of all constructs was above the threshold value of 0.50 (Table 2). Discriminant 
validity was established by ensuring that the square root of AVE for each construct exceeded the 
correlations between that construct and any other construct (see Appendix B Table B.2). Following 
the same process, we also examined the data from the mobile device users, and the results show 
that reflective measures have similarly good psychometric properties (see Table 2 and Appendix B 




Next, the structural model was examined. The results for home computer and mobile device users 
are shown side by side in Figure 2. The majority of the hypotheses were supported for each group, 
and for all but one hypothesis the outcomes were the same for each group. The model explained a 
substantial amount of the variability in security intentions (60% for home computer users and 62% 
for mobile device users), but only 11% of the variability in security behavior was explained for home 
computer users and 22% for mobile device users. 
As hypothesized, perceived vulnerability positively influenced security intentions for both the home 
computer users and the mobile device users, thus H1 was supported. A mixed result was however 
obtained for H2; while perceived severity did not significantly influence home computer user 
intentions to undertake security behaviors, it did for mobile device users; therefore H2 was only 
partially supported.  
With respect to coping appraisals, both self-efficacy and response cost significantly influenced 
security intentions as proposed, but response efficacy did not have a significant effect. Thus H3 and 
H5 were supported but H4 was rejected. 
Previous experience with information security incidents was included in the research model, and 
proposed to have an impact on threat appraisal by influencing perceived vulnerability (Maddux & 
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Rogers, 1983). As hypothesized, prior experience had a positive influence on perceived vulnerability 
for both home computer and mobile device use, and H6 was, therefore, supported. 
Mixed results were obtained with respect to the role of social influences. Subjective norm did not 
influence security intentions for either type of user, but descriptive norm had a significant influence 
on security intentions for both home computer security and mobile device security. Therefore, H7 
was rejected but H8 was supported.  
As hypothesized, psychological ownership had a significant positive influence on security intentions 
for both the home computer use and the mobile device user, so H9 was supported.  H10 was also 
supported for both types of device use as security intentions significantly influenced security 
behavior. 
The Stone-Geisser (Q2) test was also conducted to assess the predictive quality of our model 
(Geisser, 1975; Stone, 1974). As shown in Table 3, all values of Q2 are above 0. Therefore, our model 
has good predictive relevance.  
 
To further explore whether the determinants of personal computing security behavior differ 
between home computer and mobile device use, cross-group comparisons were conducted. 
Specifically, the formula of Keil et al. (2000) was used to assess the statistical differences of the path 
coefficients between home computer and mobile device. These findings are summarized in Table 4 
and show that there were significant differences in path coefficients between home computer users 
and mobile device users for all proposed relationships that were supported except for the 
relationships between self-efficacy and security intentions, and psychological ownership and security 
intentions, which were of equal strength. 
 
6 Discussion 
As proposed in the PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983), perceived vulnerability, self-efficacy and response cost 
all were important in determining personal computing security intentions. However, perceived 
severity was only found to play a role in mobile device security behavior and response efficacy did 
not influence security intentions in either group.   
Although perceived vulnerability to threats has generally been found to influence security behavior 
in organizational settings (Ifinedo, 2012; Ng et al., 2009; Siponen et al., 2014; Workman et al., 2008), 
there have been mixed findings about its impact on personal computing behavior. The current 
findings are consistent with those of Liang and Xue (2010), Chenoweth et al. (2009) and Claar and 
Johnson (2012). One possible explanation for the mixed findings is that vulnerability may mean 
different things to users depending on their environment (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015).  
The previous mixed findings about the role of perceived severity in personal computing were echoed 
in the results of this study, with it only being a determinant of security intentions for mobile device 
protection, but not for home computer protection. One explanation for why only perceived severity 
only influenced security intentions for the mobile device users lies in the concept of connectedness. 
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Connectedness is a positive emotional appraisal which is characterized by a feeling of staying in 
touch within ongoing social relationships (Rettie, 2003). When home computers are used for 
communication this is typically asynchronous in nature, such as social media or email. Mobile 
devices on the other hand are used for real-time communication, which enhances a feeling of 
connectedness which may in turn trigger intentions to take protective actions if any threat to this 
feeling is perceived as severe. Thus, the relationship between perceived severity and security 
intentions may be moderated by need for connectedness. 
The positive effect of self-efficacy and negative effect of response efficacy on security intentions for 
both home computer users and mobile device users is consistent with previous research in the 
personal computing domain (Liang & Xue, 2010; Mwagwabi et al., 2014; Woon et al., 2005). The lack 
of impact of response efficacy on security intentions for either device type was surprising, as the 
relationship has been consistently observed in both organizational and personal computing settings. 
In their meta-analysis of PMT security studies, Sommestad, Karlzén, and Hallberg (2015) found that 
relationship strength was lower when the behaviors being investigated were more general, 
compared to studies that looked at a specific behavior such as enabling a firewall. In the current 
study participants were asked about a range of common security behaviors, so this may have 
contributed to the results, but this seems unlikely to be the only reason.  
The role of prior experience with security incidents in influencing perceived vulnerability was also 
explored in this study.  We found that when a personal computing user has previously experienced a 
security breach they are more likely to feel vulnerable to threats. It appears that this experience 
provides acquired information that changes how people assess their vulnerability, countering a 
tendency to underestimate it (West, 2008). 
In addition to examining relationships associated with PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983), this study 
extended the core PMT model, and the inclusion of the additional constructs provided useful insight 
into personal security behavior. Although both subjective norm and descriptive norm were expected 
to influence intentions to practice security behavior, the results indicate that in both contexts, 
descriptive norm is a significant predictor of security intentions, yet subjective norm is not. The lack 
of influence of subjective norm suggests that in the personal computing domain, whilst users are 
influenced by what they see others do, they are not currently as aware of any expectations about 
security behavior that may exist, and even if they are aware of them, are not motivated by them. 
This possible explanation is consistent with the relatively low average levels of subjective norm in 
this study (home computers 3.97 and mobile devices 3.77 out of 7) and the weak relationships found 
by Anderson and Agarwal (2010). The findings of this study differ from those in the organizational 
domain where expectations may be very explicit, and where the “significant others” include 
authority figures as opposed to just friends and family. Godlove (2012) noted that direct supervisors 
were more important determinants of the effect of subjective norm on security intentions than 
peers, and in the personal computing domain there are no formal supervisors.  
Descriptive norm, however, is simply a perception of what others do. Thus, it can be formed 
independently and need not depend on social interaction or conversations. In both home computer 
and mobile contexts, levels of descriptive norm were higher than those of subjective norm (5.29 and 
4.43 out of 7) and found to be significant predictors of security intentions. Furthermore, the strength 
of this relationship is much stronger in the home computer context, which is consistent with the 
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greater representation of home computers in security information/media coverage. It is possible 
that this leads to more complete normative beliefs around home computers, which influenced the 
results.  
The results of this study confirmed the importance of psychological ownership in influencing security 
behavioral intentions in the personal computing domain, such that the higher the level of 
psychological ownership felt, the more likely users were to intend to protect their home computers 
and mobile devices. The relationship strengths are higher than those reported in Anderson and 
Agarwal (2010) and relatively consistent with those in a recent study that looked at how 
psychological ownership influences disclosure of personal data (Cichy, Salge, & Kohli, 2014).  
The model explained a greater proportion of the variability in home computer security intentions 
than that explained in the study by Anderson and Agarwal (2010) (60% versus 43%), and also 
explained slightly more of the variability in mobile device security intentions than was explained in 
the study by Tu et al. (2015) (62% versus 58.6%). This suggests that using PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983) 
as a base for this kind of research, but extending it to obtain greater explanatory ability is a valuable 
approach to gaining greater understanding of personal computing security behavior.   
As predicted, intentions to perform security behaviors were shown to significantly influence actual 
security behavior for both home computer users and mobile device users. There was, however, a 
significant difference in the strength of the relationship between the two types of device, with the 
relationship being stronger for mobile devices, and hence with a greater proportion of the variance 
in behavior explained. The relatively low levels of ability to explain security behavior are consistent 
with other personal information security research. For example in previous studies, intentions to 
adopt new security software explained 24.8% of adoption behavior (Shropshire et al., 2015), and 
21% of spyware software adoption behavior (Liang & Xue, 2010). In studies where intentions prove 
to have a stronger relationship with actual behavior there has generally been training and/or fear 
appeals used (e.g., Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015). Sheeran (2002) notes that one 
factor that determines how well intentions predict behavior is whether the behavior being predicted 
is a single action or an outcome that can only be achieved by performing a variety of single actions. 
Intentions are likely to be superior predictors of single actions. Securing a personal device generally 
requires multiple actions, and it is perhaps not surprising that the ability to explain a lot of the 
variance in security behavior been limited.  
The differences between the two domains are, however, of interest. A factor that may moderate the 
relationship between intention and behavior is habit (Dupuis, Crossler, & Endicott-Popovsky, 2016), 
as research has shown that the relationship is weaker for behaviors that are more routine and stable 
(Wood, Quinn, & Kashy, 2002).  Home computer security behaviors appear to be more stable and 
entrenched than mobile device security behaviors (Imgraben, Engelbrecht, & Choo, 2014; Mylonas 
et al., 2013; Tu et al., 2015) explaining the weaker relationship. 
 
6.1 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The mixed findings around some relationships are of particular interest as these generate new 
research questions and highlight areas for refinement of the research model. In particular, the role 
of perceived severity and its link to security intentions is of note, as this relationship was only 
Page 16 of 33
significant for mobile device users. More research is required around this domain to understand how 
factors such as device usage pattern and feelings of “connectedness” may influence intentions and 
the enactment these protective behaviors. Given the findings on the roles of subjective norm and 
descriptive norm it would also be useful for future work to investigate how personal computing 
users obtain knowledge about security, and how this links with their mental models and normative 
beliefs. 
While the proposed model explained variability in intention to perform security behaviors relatively 
well for both types of device, it was much less successful in explaining the security behavior of home 
computer users. Future research should investigate factors that influence security behavior directly 
in order to obtain a more complete picture of what determines information security behavior. These 
factors may include habit (Dupuis et al., 2016), need for connectedness (Rettie, 2003) and 
personality (Shropshire et al., 2015). 
Whilst the current study goes beyond intentions to actual behavior it is limited by its reliance on self-
report measures of security behavior with data collection at only a single point of time.  Consistent 
with the call by Crossler et al. (2013) for more focus on actual behavior as opposed to security 
intentions, the measurement of security intentions and behavior also require further attention. The 
availability of validated measures of intention such as the Security Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS) 
(Egelman & Peer, 2015), will facilitate cross study comparisons; however, to improve understanding 
of information security behavior more availability of standard validated measurement instruments 
and methods of direct measurement are needed. Direct observation of user behavior is an under-
explored research approach, which has potential to provide a greater insight into ongoing behavior 
than self-report scales.  
A further limitation of the study is that fear (an emotional feeling toward threat) was not included in 
the proposed model. Fear was included in the revised PMT (Rogers, 1983) and several recent studies 
have explored its potential mediating role (e.g., Boss et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015). Differences in 
how security threat appraisals affect fear in different contexts may impact on security behavior. 
6.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE  
This research has considered significant factors leading to security intentions and behaviors and 
provided a much needed perspective on the under-researched home computer and mobile device 
segments. The findings when considered together shed light on the research question, revealing that 
there are possible differences in the determinants of personal computing security behavior between 
home computer and mobile device use. This suggests that knowledge and experience of security 
tasks may be tied to the operating context and users may not always generalize security knowledge 
across all computing devices. It is possible that this may lead to greater risks in the mobile 
environment if traditionally desktop applications are ported to a mobile environment without 
adequate real world security evaluation. 
For developers and security professionals, there are two main practical implications from the 
research findings.  Firstly, it may be inadvisable to assume that any security knowledge or 
background developed by users in a home computer context will immediately translate to 
equivalent behavior in a mobile environment. All aspects of the computing experience, including 
user experience, software design and interface development should be adequately grounded in the 
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appropriate target platform to ensure that results are as predicted and that users are not unwittingly 
exposed to increased risks. 
Secondly, the research finding that users may have incomplete or inadequately developed 
normative beliefs is something that may be addressed practically. The potential for social norms to 
be targeted to improve security behavior has been demonstrated (Herath & Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 
2014), and in a personal computing security context, a positive step would be simply to advance 
from one-sided user guidance material toward communities of practice, combining the benefits of 
the shared pool of knowledge, with the social normative influence providing an extra boost to 
productive behaviors. The communication capabilities of any home computer or mobile platform 
provide ample functionality for interaction between users. However, what is lacking is a move from 
silos of knowledge like web forums, to full integrated, real-time interaction, possibly frequented and 
mediated by representatives from vendors or other experts to reinforce positive behavior. 
Conclusion 
Personal computing users are vulnerable to information security threats as they need to 
independently make decisions about how to protect themselves, often with little knowledge of the 
technology involved or understanding of the implications. Whilst personal computing has previously 
been primarily associated with desktop and laptop computers, with the growth in use of tablets and 
smartphones to access and store important personal and financial information (Dulaney et al. 2014) 
there is a need for more information security research that focusses on security behavior associated 
with different device types. The study described in this paper attempts to improve understanding of 
personal computing security behavior by proposing and testing a model of personal computing 
security behavior that extends PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983), to incorporate previous findings on the 
roles of psychological ownership and social influence (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Tu et al., 2015) 
and to explicitly include security behavior. We also believe that it is the first study to explicitly 
compare model performance over different device types, with the model being tested separately 
with home computer users and mobile device users in order to explore whether the determinants of 
personal computing security behavior differ between home computer and mobile device use. 
The results of the study show that perceived vulnerability, self-efficacy, response cost, descriptive 
norm and psychological ownership all were important in determining personal computing security 
intentions and behavior for both home computer users and mobile device users. However, 
perceived severity was only found to play a role in mobile device security behavior and neither 
response efficacy nor subjective norm influenced security intentions for either type of user. These 
findings have both practical implications and implications for future research into personal 
computing behavior.   
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Figure 1: Research Model. 
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Figure 2: Structural model results. 
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Table 1: Background information about participants. 




Gender   
 Male  39.9% 35.0% 
 Female  60.1% 65.0% 
Age   
 18-24  2.5% 3.0% 
 25-34 8.2% 7.9% 
 35-44  12.3% 15.4% 
 45-54 19.8% 19.7% 
 55-64  33.0% 33.1% 
 65 or older 24.3% 21.0% 
Self-rated skill with computers   
 Poor  0.6% 0.7% 
 Below average 3.1% 2.9% 
 Average  29.5% 33.9% 
 Good 46.6% 44.0% 
 Excellent  20.2% 18.6% 
Previous information security training   
 Yes  20.2% 17.6% 
 No 79.8% 82.4% 
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Table 2: Construct validity and reliability. 
   
Constructs Home computer model Mobile device model 
 CA CR AVE CA CR AVE 
Perceived vulnerability  .92 .94 .72 .93 .95 .75 
Perceived severity  .94 .95 .78 .94 .96 .76 
Self-efficacy .90 .92 .67 .92 .94 .71 
Response efficacy .94 .95 .84 .95 .97 .87 
Response cost .95 .96 .76 .95 .96 .76 
Prior experience* - - - - - - 
Subjective norm .94 .96 .88 .96 .97 .92 
Descriptive norm .94 .95 .84 .94 .96 .84 
Psychological ownership .91 .93 .65 .92 .94 .68 
Security intentions  .96 .97 .89 .96 .97 .90 
Security behavior - - - - - - 
*As a single item was used to measure prior experience and a composite score was used to measure 
security behavior, CA, CR and AVE were not computed. 
 
 
Table 3: Predictive relevance (Q2). 






Perceived vulnerability .72 .75 
Perceived severity .78 .79 
Self-efficacy .67 .71 
Response efficacy .84 .87 
Response cost .76 .76 
Subjective norm .88 .92 
Descriptive norm .84 .84 
Psychological ownership .65 .68 
Security intentions .89 .90 
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Table 4: Path coefficient comparison between home computer users and mobile device users. 
Path 
Home Computer Users 
(N=322) 
Mobile Device Users 
(N=307) 








PV → SI .12 .05 .19 .08 p < .001 Yes 
PS → SI .01 .04 .13 .06 p < .001 Yes 
SE → SI .29 .07 .29 .05 p > .05 No 
RE → SI .08 .07 .09 .06 p < .05 Yes 
RC → SI -.19 .04 -.12 .04 p < .001 Yes 
PE → PV .22 .06 .18 .05 p < .001 Yes 
SN → SI .01 .05 .02 .06 p < .05 Yes 
DN → SI .25 .06 .11 .05 p < .001 Yes 
PO → SI .24 .07 .24 .06 p > .05 No 
SI → SB .34 .06 .47 .05 p < .001 Yes 
Note: PE = prior experience, PV = perceived vulnerability, PS = perceived severity, RC = response cost, RE = 
response efficacy, SE = self-efficacy, DN = descriptive norm, SN = subjective norm, PO = psychological 
ownership, SI = security intentions, SB = security behavior.  
Note: In both models, the path RE -> SI and SN -> SI are not significant. Therefore, the significant result of 
comparison test may not be meaningful.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1 - Items used to measure constructs (where device was either ‘smartphone / tablet’ or 





al., 2014)  
Have you ever experienced a security breach (e.g. had your email account, 
online shopping account or banking account hacked into)? If yes, please 
indicate the degree to which that experience affected you (e.g. in terms of lost 









A security breach on my device would be a serious problem for me  
Loss of information resulting from hacking would be a serious problem for me 
Having my confidential information on my device accessed by someone 
without my consent or knowledge would be a serious problem for me. 
Having someone successfully attack and damage my device would be very 
problematic for me 
I view information security attacks on me as harmful 




Siponen et al., 
2014; Woon 
et al., 2005) 
I could be subject to a serious information security threat  
I am facing more and more information security threats 
I feel that my device could be vulnerable to a security threat  
It is likely that my device will be compromised in the future  
My information and data is vulnerable to security breaches: 
I could fall victim to a malicious attack if I fail to follow good security practices 
Response cost 





Taking security measures inconveniences me  
There are too many overheads associated with taking security measures to 
protect my device 
Taking security measures would require considerable investment of effort 
Implementing security measures on my device would be time consuming 
The cost of implementing recommended security measures exceeds the 
benefits 
The impact of security measures on my productivity exceeds the benefits 
Response 
efficacy 
(Woon et al., 
2005) 
 
Enabling security measures on my device will prevent security breaches 
Implementing security measures on my device is an effective way to prevent 
hackers 
Enabling security measures on my device will prevent hackers from stealing my 
identity 
The preventative measures available to stop people from getting confidential 
personal or financial information on my device are effective 
  






I feel comfortable taking measures to secure my device 
Taking the necessary security measures is entirely under my control 
I have the resources and the knowledge to take the necessary security 
measures 
Taking the necessary security measures is easy 
I can protect my device by myself  




Taylor & Todd, 
1995) 
Friends who influence my behavior think that I should take measures to secure 
my device 
Significant others who are important to me think that I should take measures 
to secure my primary device 







I believe other people implement security measures on their devices 
I believe the majority of people implement security measures on their devices 
to help protect the Internet 
I am convinced other people take security measures on their devices 
It is likely that the majority of home computer users take security measures to 





I feel a high degree of ownership for my device and its contents 
The information stored in my device is very important to me. 
I personally invested a lot in my device (e.g. time, effort, money)  
I personally invested a lot in the software/applications on my device (e.g. time, 
effort, money) 
When I think about it, I see an extension of my life in my device 
I have personalized my device to better suit the way I use it 




Taylor & Todd, 
1995) 
I am likely to take security measures on my device 
It is possible that I will take security measures to protect my device 
I am certain that I will take security measures to protect my device 





of Liang & 
Xue, 2010) 
I have installed security software on my device  
I have recent backups of my device  
I have enabled automatic updating of my computer software 
I use security software (anti-virus/anti malware) 
My device is secured by a password 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B.1. Descriptive statistics and item loadings 
 Home Computers Mobile Devices 
Item Mean SD Loading Mean SD Loading 
PE 1.13 1.48 - 1.09 1.44 - 
PV1 4.83 1.51 .87 4.72 1.62 .85 
PV2 4.40 1.63 .85 4.42 1.65 .89 
PV3 4.71 1.58 .92 4.79 1.65 .91 
PV4 4.41 1.47 .88 4.25 1.59 .85 
PV5 4.49 1.49 .90 4.52 1.65 .89 
PV6 5.61 1.42 .67 5.35 1.47 .80 
PS1 5.93 1.36 .88 5.34 1.69 .87 
PS2 5.87 1.42 .88 5.58 1.61 .91 
PS3 6.11 1.26 .92 5.67 1.63 .91 
PS4 6.12 1.24 .90 5.81 1.55 .93 
PS5 6.29 1.10 .88 6.19 1.17 .83 
PS6 6.40 .98 .84 6.01 1.32 .88 
RC1 3.20 1.84 .85 3.30 1.66 .84 
RC2 3.18 1.73 .86 3.51 1.57 .88 
RC3 2.98 1.71 .91 3.36 1.60 .91 
RC4 3.31 1.79 .87 3.61 1.65 .85 
RC5 3.43 1.75 .86 3.69 1.57 .88 
RC6 2.97 1.80 .87 3.49 1.66 .88 
RC7 3.06 1.78 .88 3.47 1.54 .85 
RE1 5.18 1.35 .93 4.89 1.33 .92 
RE2 5.42 1.23 .92 5.05 1.29 .95 
RE3 5.04 1.38 .91 4.83 1.41 .94 
RE4 5.13 1.25 .91 4.81 1.40 .94 
SE1 5.80 1.25 .85 5.18 1.37 .82 
SE2 5.77 1.23 .85 5.39 1.38 .77 
SE3 5.46 1.37 .90 4.77 1.62 .89 
SE4 5.23 1.38 .82 4.64 1.55 .89 
SE5 4.97 1.58 .62 4.56 1.65 .80 
SE6 5.51 1.42 .84 4.92 1.54 .88 
DN1 5.37 1.26 .89 4.58 1.44 .88 
DN2 5.30 1.33 .94 4.40 1.55 .93 
DN3 5.25 1.33 .93 4.39 1.53 .95 
DN4 5.25 1.35 .91 4.35 1.54 .91 
SN1 3.88 1.70 .92 3.70 1.61 .96 
SN2 4.07 1.70 .95 3.85 1.69 .96 
SN3 3.94 1.70 .95 3.77 1.59 .97 
PO1 5.84 1.21 .83 5.31 1.41 .74 
PO2 5.90 1.15 .83 5.28 1.53 .82 
PO3 5.44 1.34 .89 4.86 1.66 .88 
PO4 5.08 1.47 .79 4.15 1.80 .84 
PO5 5.02 1.50 .79 4.13 1.83 .87 
PO6 5.34 1.37 .81 4.68 1.66 .79 
PO7 4.89 1.58 .73 4.04 1.85 .83 
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SI1 5.92 1.17 .94 4.94 1.44 .95 
SI2 5.86 1.19 .95 5.09 1.37 .92 
SI3 5.93 1.16 .95 4.84 1.57 .96 
SI4 5.92 1.18 .93 4.96 1.53 .96 
SB 3.72 1.33 - 2.20 1.60 - 
Note: PE = prior experience, PV = perceived vulnerability, PS = perceived severity, RC = response cost, RE = 
response efficacy, SE = self-efficacy, DN = descriptive norm, SN = subjective norm, PO = psychological 
ownership, SI = security intentions, SB = security behavior 
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Table B.2 - Correlation between constructs and square-root of AVEs on diagonal (home 
computers). 
      PE SB   PV  PS  RC      RE  SE    DN   SN   PO   SI 
PE - 
          
SB - .08 - 
         
PV .22 .00 .85 
        
PS - .02 .06 .38 .88 
       
RC .15 - .19 .28 - .12 .87 
      
RE - .06 .13 - .01 .24 - .19 .92 
     
SE - .07 .35 .03 .28 - .33 .64 .82 
    
DN - .07 .13 .27 .30 - .16 .35 .30 .91 
   
SN .19 .03 .47 .22 .32 .09 .08 .27 .94 
  
PO .02 .22 .28 .51 - .19 .47 .60 .36 .26 .81 
 
SI - .10 .34 .22 .37 - .34 .50 .63 .52 .17 .62 .94 
Note: PE = prior experience, PV = perceived vulnerability, PS = perceived severity, RC = response cost, RE = response efficacy, SE 




Table B.3 - Correlation between constructs and square-root of AVEs on diagonal (mobile devices). 
                 PE SB   PV   PS  RC      RE  SE    DN   SN   PO   SI 
PE - 
          
SB - .03 - 
         
PV .18 .14 .86 
        
PS .10 .25 .52 .89 
       
RC .24 - .17 .14 -.10 .87 
      
RE .03 .38 .28 .43 - .09 .94 
     
SE - .04 .45 .22 .30 - .23 .62 .84 
    
DN .03 .24 .28 .26 .07 .48 .44 .92 
   
SN .17 .19 .43 .35 .16 .36 .28 .48 .96 
  
PO .10 .45 .41 .61 - .09 .58 .48 .34 .43 .82 
 
SI .05 .47 .46 .54 - .19 .59 .62 .45 .39 .64 .95 
Note: PE = prior experience, PV = perceived vulnerability, PS = perceived severity, RC = response cost, RE = response efficacy, SE 
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